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Abstract This article examines two Buddhist explanations of how a conceptual
cognition, whose object is a universal, can give rise to activity that leads to a
particular. In both theories, that of Dharmottara and that of Ratnakı¯rti, this activity is
due to a kind of error. A detailed investigation of how this error happens shows that
there were big differences in the two underlying epistemological models.
Keywords Buddhist epistemology · Conceptual cognition · Determination ·
Dharmottara · Ratnakı¯rti
This article1 tries to answer the following question: what exactly is it that Ratnakı¯rti
overtly criticizes about Dharmottara’s theory of conceptual cognition (i.e., his
apoha theory)?2
This question touches upon a topic which was extensively discussed both within
various sub-groups of Indian Buddhism, and between Indian Buddhists and their
non-Buddhist opponents, amongst whom the Naiya¯yikas and Mı¯ma¯ṃsakas stand out
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1 The research for this article, as well as my attendance at the XVIth Congress of the IABS in Taiwan
where I read my first draft of the material, was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): NFN S9805,
Subproject “Philosophy” of the National Research Network “The Cultural History of the Western
Himalaya from the 8th Century (S98).” I would like to thank Markus Viehbeck and Masamichi Sakai for
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2 What Ratnakı¯rti criticizes here is, of course, also criticized by his teacher Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra. But in this
article I am more interested in the way that Ratnakı¯rti presents the matter. Covertly, Ratnakı¯rti criticizes a
few things about Dharmottara’s apoha theory. Akamatsu (1986) is the most detailed treatment of
differences between Dharmottara and Ratnakı¯rti. McCrea and Patil (2006) cover the relation between
Dharmakı¯rti, Dharmottara and Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra.
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in Ratnakı¯rti’s writings.3 At its broadest, this topic concerns the question of whether
cognition has a form or not;4 and, if it has one, what exactly that form is, and what
its role in cognition is. The focus of this article, however, is to analyse what the 11th
century5 Buddhist monk and scholar Ratnakı¯rti had to say about this question in the
specific context of a criticism of an earlier Buddhist scholar, Dharmottara (ca. 740–
800 CE), who wrote extensively and originally about the same problem. The line of
inquiry is further narrowed down by a confinement to only two of Ratnakı¯rti’s texts,
the Apohasiddhi (AS) and the Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda (CAPV).
The reason for focusing on these two texts is simple. First, it is in the AS that
Ratnakı¯rti criticizes Dharmottara. This criticism is related to a discussion about the
function of a form in cognition, and especially in conceptual cognition. Since this
function is often appealed to in ways that are not easy to make good sense of, the
preliminary question that must be answered is this: what is the role of a form (ākāra)
in determination (adhyavasāya) for Ratnakı¯rti? To this end, then, the CAPV was
selected because this is the text in which Ratnakı¯rti discusses the role of cognition’s
form in the greatest detail, and it thus seemed most likely that what is difficult to
understand in the AS is explained, or at least becomes clearer, in the CAPV. For a
definitive assessment of Ratnakı¯rti’s position, however, one will have to take into
account also his other texts, a project that lies outside the scope of the present paper.
Ratnakīrti’s Criticism of Dharmottara’s Apoha Theory
Ratnakı¯rti’s criticism of an aspect of Dharmottara’s apoha theory is found in the
following passage:6
3 Cf. Thakur (1975a, 16 ff.). In the Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda (CAPV), Ratnakı¯rti quotes Trilocana and
Va¯caspatimis´ra by name (CAPV 135). From Va¯caspati the Nyāyakaṇikā is quoted. What is surprising is
that Ratnakı¯rti apparently accepts the criticism expressed in those two quotes, of course only to modify
the position accordingly in the next step.
4 Katsura (1986, p. 178, n. 5) attributes nirākāravāda, the teaching that cognition is without form, to
Dharmottara. Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra and Ratnakı¯rti are clearly adherents of the teaching that cognition does have a
form (sākāravāda, cf. Kajiyama 1998, p. 155). These attributions are to be understood as pertaining to the
cognition of an awakened being. In the CAPV, however, Ratnakı¯rti definitely discusses the various
positions as far as they concern a non-omniscient mind: tatrāsarvajñe ’numātari sakalavipakṣapra-
tibhāsābhāvān na grāhyatayā vipakṣo viṣayo vaktavyaḥ, … (With regard to this [inference], in the case of
a non-omniscient inferrer, the counter-instance is not to be called an object due to being grasped because
there is no appearance of the whole counter-instance; …)
The inference under discussion is the one that establishes that what appears to cognition is a unitary,
variegated form (cf. footnote 15). The problem at this point (and in fact, for a big part: CAPV 130.33–
141.8 according to my understanding) is how one can know that the reason—that something appears to
cognition—does not qualify a counter-instance (vipakṣa)—something that is not one. For, a counter-
instance either appears to cognition (in which case it is obviously qualified by the reason) or does not (in
which case it is difficult to say much about it).
5 All the dates for historical figures’ lives in this article are taken from Steinkellner and Much (1995),
unless noted otherwise.
6 Patil (2011) contains a full translation of the AS, as does Mc Allister (2011).
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Passage 1: Criticism of Dharmottara So7 in this way an affirmation[, as well
as a negation,] in reality establishes neither a form [of awareness] nor an
external [object]. For, [affirmation and negation] conventionally [establish an
object] only externally. But even conventionally [there is] no [such
establishment] of a form.8 Through this [verse] what Dharmottara says
uncommonly, against scripture, and illogically, namely that [there is]
affirmation and negation of the externality of that which is superimposed, is
also rejected.
Ratnakı¯rti’s further explanations about this point are concerned to show that
determination as he understands it is possible, and does not lead to the problems that a
superimposition due to similarity would.9 Ratnakı¯rti does not go into much detail
concerning what those problems would be. The main point seems to be that similarity
between an appearance internal to the mind and the external object is not sufficient for
successful activity; rather, determination, which directs this activity, works just due to
a connection to a specific internal object (ākāraviśeṣayogāt, AS 66.2), and so the
external thing plays no important role in this explanation of activity.10
So all we have to go on, so far, is that Ratnakı¯rti criticizes Dharmottara for
assuming that affirmation and negation are directed at “the externality of that which
is superimposed.” In order to proceed, we therefore need to find out, first, what
Ratnakı¯rti takes the object of affirmation and negation to be, and, second, what the
difference is to Dharmottara’s position.
Determination and Forms in the AS
In the following two passages of the AS a relation between determination and form
can be seen quite easily. In both of these passages, Ratnakı¯rti is explaining his
7 AS 65.20–24: tad evaṃ
nākārasya na bāhyasya tattvato vidhisādhanam | bahir eva hi saṃvṛtyā saṃvṛtyāpi tu nākṛteḥ ||
etena yad dharmottaraḥ — āropitasya bāhyatvasya vidhiniṣedhāv ity alaukikam anāgamam atārkikīyaṃ
kathayati, tad apy apahastitam. As noted by Frauwallner (1937, p. 266, n. 1), Dharmottara makes this
point in his Apohaprakaraṇa (DhAP 244.3–4): sgrub pa daṅ dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gaṅ źig phyi rol
ñid du ṅes par byas pa de daṅ ’brel pa yin te. See Passage 6 for a translation of the passage. Frauwallner
(1937, p. 266) translates this sentence as: “Dagegen wird eine Bejahung oder Verneinung mit dem
U¨bertragenen verbunden, das als außen bestimmt wird.” The Sanskrit quoted by Ratnakı¯rti does not
match up to the Tibetan in at least one important respect: an equivalent for ṅes par byas pa is missing.
8 The translation of this verse by McCrea and Patil (2006, p. 338) is as follows: “There is no way of
really affirming either the mental image or the external object. Conventionally [there is affirmation] only
of externals, whereas even conventionally there is no [affirmation] of the mental image.”
9 Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra argues for each of the three claims (against scripture, common sense, and logical reason),
and a fine translation can be found in McCrea and Patil (2010, 92 ff.). The gist of Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra’s
argument is that without basing oneself on the two truths, conventional and absolute, an object of
everyday activity (classically a cow) can not be talked about. If one tries to explain it without recourse to
these two truths, one goes against common understanding, according to which one acts simply towards a
real object. One similarly goes against tradition, because it maintains that in reality nothing real at all can
be named by words. And one also goes against reason, because the position is untenable.
10 Much of what is here only hinted at by Ratnakı¯rti is repeated and discussed in more detail in CAPV
138.12 ff.
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definition of the word-referent: a positive element (vidhi) qualified by the exclusion
from others (anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ (AS 59.5)) The aim of this
formulation is to balance two elements that many of Ratnakı¯rti’s predecessors take
as instrumental in using concepts: a negative one, the exclusion of what is not meant
by a word (anyāpoha), and a positive one, which, according to Ratnakı¯rti, can be
seen both as a representation appearing to awareness and as an object that is
imagined as external and temporally extended. In Ratnakı¯rti’s theory, the negative
element should be taken as a property of the positive one.11
Passage 2: vidhi (a) And12 by the word “positive element” an external object
that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to
determination, and according to appearance a form of awareness [is meant].
Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word
because of determination alone, not because of a particular’s appearance, since
there is no appearance of a manifest particular that is limited as to space, time
and condition, as there is in the case of perception.
Passage 3: vidhi (b) So13 in this way only a positive element is the referent of
a word. And this [positive element] is intended to be called the external object
and the form of awareness. Amongst these, [there is] no affirmation [or]
negation of the form of awareness in reality or in a conventional sense,
because of the fact that [it] is understood through a perception [of the type]
self-awareness, and because [the form of awareness] is not determined. In
reality, too, there is no negation or affirmation of the external either, because
of its non-appearance in verbal apprehension. Precisely for this [reason] all
properties [of an object] are inexpressible in reality, because there is no
determination [or] appearance [of them]. Therefore there is conventional
affirmation and negation of an external [object] only, because otherwise there
is the [unwanted] consequence that everyday interaction is ruined.
Thefirst of these passages (Passage2) is concernedwith the interpretationof thepositive
part in the definition, the vidhi. It is said to have two sides, depending on how it is present
to awareness: if determined, it is an external object differentiated from certain other
objects; if manifest, or directly present to awareness, it is a form of awareness.
Building on this, Ratnakı¯rti says in the Passage 3 how this vidhi is the object of
activity (either positive or negative), distinguishing two ways of looking at the
situation: in reality, on the one hand, no aspect of the vidhi, neither the determined
and external nor the manifest and internal aspect, is the object that people usually
act towards. In a conventional sense, on the other hand, the external aspect of the
11 For the reason why this issue is important, see Akamatsu (1986) and Kataoka (2009, 484 ff).
12 AS 60.20–23: vidhiśabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atadrūpaparāvṛtto bāhyo ’rtho ’bhimataḥ,
yathāpratibhāsaṃ buddhyākāraś ca. tatra bāhyo ’rtho ’dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācyo vyavasthāpyate,
na svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyatapravyaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.
13 AS 65.15–20: tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca bāhyo ’rtho buddhyākāraś ca vivakṣitaḥ. tatra na
buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ saṃvṛtyā vā vidhiniṣedhau, svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatvād anadhya-
vasāyāc ca. nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhiniṣedhau, tasya śābde pratyaye ’pratibhāsanāt. ata eva
sarvadharmāṇāṃ tattvato ’nabhilāpyatvam, pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt. tasmād bāhyasyaiva sāṃvṛtau
vidhiniṣedhau, anyathā saṃvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt.
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vidhi is indeed what we act towards. The internal aspect is not an object even in this
conventional sense.
Many questions might be raised as to what these two statements about the vidhi
are suggesting: is it one vidhi, seen in two different ways, or two vidhis? Are these
two things or aspects somehow related, so that one could not exist without the other,
or do they occur independently of each other? Is there some kind of causal relation
between them?
For the purpose of our investigation, I would like to avoid most of the difficulties
one gets into by asking these questions, and just focus on one subset of the problem:
how is the internal aspect of the vidhi, the form appearing to awareness, linked to
activity that has an external object as its aim? In other words, how is the result of
determination linked to the form appearing to cognition?
In order to answer this question, one has to know what determination is.
Fortunately, the last few years have seen plenty of progress on the concept of
determination, or adhyavasāya. The most useful publications for our purposes are
McCrea and Patil (2006), which focuses on Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra’s view on determination
and its philosophical history, and Patil (2009, pp. 250–288), which analyzes
Ratnakı¯rti’s epistemology very closely.14
Determination in Ratnakı¯rti’s AS
The two main functions of determination, or adhyavasāya, in Ratnakı¯rti’s theory of
conceptual cognition are the externalisation and the generalization of a form
(ākāra), something that is “in” cognition.15
The easier one to understand is the externalisation component: a person who
perceives, by means of self-awareness, a form that appears in cognition determines
this form as external, or as being an external object. In the AS, Ratnakı¯rti does not
give any detailed explanations as to how this externalisation works. But there is a
passage in the CAPV in which he does:16
14 Both of these publications are concerned also with the more general questions just mentioned. In
addition, I have tried to look at adhyavasāya’s role in the AS myself (Mc Allister, forthcoming). In the
following, I build also on that article’s main points.
15 In the guiding inference of the CAPV, Ratnakı¯rti gives a detailed list of what the term ākāra can refer
to:
CAPV 129.22–24: yat prakāśate tad ekam. yathā citrākāracakramadhyavartī nīlākāraḥ. prakāśate
cedaṃ gauragāndhāramadhurasurabhisukumārasātetarādivicitrākārakadambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.
(What appears, that is one. Like the form of blue occurring amidst a circle of various forms. And this
collection of various forms, [such as] white, sounding [like the third note] “ga,” sweet, fragrant, soft,
pleasurable and the opposite [of it], etc., appears. [This is a proof using] the nature [of the pakṣa as] a
reason.)
Even though I am not completely confident about my translation (especially whether the understanding
of gāndhāra is correct), the main points of this passage are clear: in one appearance to cognition, multiple
“forms” are present to awareness. A “form,” ākāra, thus corresponds to or represents properties of
objects. But it should not be understood as being restricted to the shape of a thing, since a thing can
appear to awareness in the form of its smell, its sound, etc.
16 In fact, this explanation is given in defense of Prajn˜a¯karagupta’s position (cf. CAPV 137.6–9).
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Passage 4: adhyavasāya according to the CAPV For17 it is so: based on the
mere knowledge of a particular appearance of [cognition] itself, which is
attained by the power of an immediately [preceding] cause, determination
incites activity toward something else, even though [that is] not grasped. …
For it is so: in virtue of beginningless variegated impressions, a conceptual
cognition, arising, in dependence on a particular cause that awakens [these
impressions], with a certain form, brings forth a connection [to] a memory of
causal efficacy, desire [for such an efficacy], etc., which is conducive towards
activity directed towards an external object. Because of this, there are, for
someone aiming to bring about an aim of a human being, regulations for
positive and negative activity [such that these regulations] correspond to the
external things, because a similar relation of cause and effect, which the
moments [making up] the continuous flow of an unawakened being have, is
fixed.18
The externalisation that determination performs is therefore best understood as a
directing at something that is actually not represented in this directing awareness in
any way. It would seem, then, that this externalisation does not really show
something internal to cognition as something external, but rather that it incites
activity towards an unseen external thing based on something appearing to
cognition. The point stressed here is that the link between the internal and external
component is not, or at least not primarily, one of phenomenal similarity (what
appears does not look like something out there), but a kind of causal similarity, such
that what appears is the effect of something (usually a perception) awakening
impressions gathered throughout a mental continuum’s career, and is in turn a cause
for doing something about something “out there.”
A proper interpretation of the second function of determination, generalization,
presupposes an understanding of the apoha theory. The difficulties of arriving at
an adequate understanding of this theory are considerable,19 and even if successful
this understanding would not contribute much to answering the question that is of
interest to us.20 For our current purpose, it may then be enough to say that the
17 CAPV 137.9–16: tathā hi samanantarapratyayabalāyātasvapratibhāsaviśeṣavedanamātrād agṛhīte ’pi
paratra pravṛttyākṣepo ’dhyavasāyaḥ. …
tathā hi vicitrānādivāsanāvaśāt prabodhakapratyayaviśeṣāpekṣayā vikalpaḥ kenacid ākāreṇopajāyamāna
eva bahirmukhapravṛttyanukūlam arthakriyāsmaraṇābhilāṣādiprabandham ādhatte. tataḥ puruṣārtha-
kriyārthino bahirarthānurūpāṇi pravṛttinivṛttyavadhāraṇāni bhavanti, pṛthagjanasantānajñānakṣaṇānāṃ
tādṛśo hetuphalabhāvasya niyatatvāt.
18 I am not quite sure how to understand that this relation is similar. It could mean that the cause-effect
relation governing the moments of a mental continuum can not be completely different from that
governing the object’s continuum. To explain, if a moment in the continuum constituting a particular cow
causes a perceptual cognition, the causal chains arising from that moment—that of the cow itself and that
resulting in my climbing back over the fence subsequent to my cognition “Oh, a cow!”—are similar in
some regard. One point in common would be that they are bound to the same cause.
19 Also, there are other, better attempts than can be given here: for Ratnakı¯rti in particular, cf. Patil
(2003; 2009, Chap. V), and my own attempt in Mc Allister (2011, Chap. 5).
20 Such an inquiry would, however, explain how the ākāra can be qualified by other-exclusion (i.e., the
anyāpohaviśiṣṭa in the definition referred to above). I have tried to specify this relation in Mc Allister
(2011, Sect. 5.3).
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central problem Ratnakı¯rti, as many Buddhist epistemologists before him, purports
to solve with this theory is how it is possible that two different particulars are
judged to be the same. So let us imagine the apoha theory is successful in this
regard, and is indeed a viable way of making sameness possible, or of classifying
things, such that in the following we can simply speak of things being judged as
the same instead of things being judged as being differentiated from the same sort
of other things.
In this case, one aspect of the apoha theory remains which is of interest to us:21
namely, the way in which a form or ākāra can be the basis for a conceptual
cognition of sameness.
Ratnakı¯rti’s answer is well in line with the account given by Dharmakı¯rti: the
ākāra is involved in an error inherent in conceptual cognition.22 He explains this in
detail in the following passage:
Passage 5: Erroneous appearance Neither23 does a universal appear in a
verbal cognition. Because of a word such as “cow” etc. in [the sentence]
“Cows are grazing on the other side of the river,” dewlap, horn, tail etc.
appear, [which are] accompanied by the forms of phonemes, [and which are]
mostly [just] lumped together24 because differences between [things] belong-
ing to the same genus are disregarded. But exactly this is not a universal. For
[the universal] “cowness” is proclaimed to be devoid of colour, shape, and the
forms of phonemes. But precisely this mere [heap of] dewlap, horn etc., which
is identified with the particular though completely different in every individual
[cow], is called a universal. This [is] only an error because such an external
[object] is not obtained, like the appearance of hair [to someone suffering from
an eye disease is only an error].25 Therefore, [a universal] may either be this
21 Perhaps one should be careful about calling this an aspect of the apoha theory. If the apoha theory is
taken to involve psychological or epistemological explanations about how apoha is understood, then this
role that the ākāras play should certainly be called a part of it. But seeing it like this might lead one to
think that the apoha theory is also what explains why the ākāras play the role they do. I think this is not
what the apoha theory was intended to do, but is rather something that is part of the broader theory about
how cognition (of unawakened beings) works. And it is this theory, or conceptual framework, which
explains why forms play different roles in conceptual cognition. The apoha theory would then be adopted
to work within this overall framework.
22 Cf. PVin 2 k. 1, and the interpretation (based on the Tibetan text and Sanskrit fragments) in
Steinkellner (1979, 26 f.).
23 AS 63.10–19: nāpi sāmānyaṃ śābdapratyayapratibhāsi. saritaḥ pāre gāvaś carantīti gavādiśabdāt
sāsnāśṛṅgalāṅgūlādayo ’kṣarākāraparikaritāḥ sajātīyabhedāparāmarśanāt sampiṇḍitaprāyāḥ pra-
tibhāsante. na ca tad eva sāmānyam.
varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyaṃ gotvaṃ hi kathyate |
tad eva ca sāsnāśṛṅgādimātram akhilavyaktāv atyantavilakṣaṇam api svalakṣaṇenaikīkriyamāṇaṃ
sāmānyam ity ucyate. tādṛśasya bāhyasyāprāpter bhrāntir evāsau, keśapratibhāsavat. tasmād vāsanāva-
śād buddher eva tadātmanā vivarto ’yam astu, asad eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu, vyaktaya eva vā
sajātīyabhedatiraskāreṇānyathā bhāsantām anubhavavyavadhānāt, smṛtipramoṣo vābhidhīyatām. sarv-
athā nirviṣayaḥ khalv ayaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ. kva sāmānyavārtā. The “neither” introduces the second
alternative of how a real universal might become known. The first was that it could be perceived.
24 This translation for sampiṇḍita is borrowed from Patil (2011, p. 12).
25 Someone suffering from timira is said to see nets of hair which aren’t really there. According to Chu
(2004, p. 131, fn. 67), Anne MacDonald has identified timira as muscae volitantes (floaters).
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unfolding only of the mind itself as having the nature of this [universal] in
virtue of remaining impressions; or [it may be] that having its[, i.e., the
universal’s,] form, which is simply inexistent, appears; or the individuals
themselves might appear in some other way without regard to the differences
of [things] belonging to the same genus because [differences amongst things]
are hidden from experience; or a deprivation of memory may be considered
[as the reason]. In all ways, this cognition of a universal is truly without an
object. [So] where [is there] news of a universal?
In the first part of this passage, Ratnakı¯rti explains what appears in a verbal
cognition: in the case of the word “cow” this is apparently a dewlap, horn, tail, etc.
Note that the word “cow” in the example sentence is plural, so “dewlap, horn, tail,
etc.” should be taken to jointly characterize several cows.
First, the form appearing to conceptual awareness has what one might want to
call an inner structure, such that what appears on understanding the word “cow” is
not a single, unitary appearance (like, I imagine, blue), but has internal distinctions
into elements corresponding to the parts of cows.26
A second characteristic of this form is that its elements are “lumped together”
because the differences between the individual cows grazing on the other side of the
river are not taken into account. That means that what appears on understanding the
word “cow” is a dewlap, a pair of horns, a tail and so on, each of which one thinks
are common to all the cows one is told are grazing on the other side of the river. One
has lumped all these facets together because the differences found between all cows,
e.g., that each has its own, specific dewlap, are not paid close attention to.
After stating that it is an error to take this appearance of a common dewlap, horn,
tail etc. to be the appearance of a universal, Ratnakı¯rti mentions four possibilities for
how this appearance can come about:
1. It is an unfolding of mind itself.
2. Something completely inexistent having the form of a universal appears.
3. The real things appear other than they are.
4. There is an unnoticed interference of memory with the appearance.
So it is only on the basis of an error that the form appearing in conceptual cognition can
give rise to the idea of the sameness among things. But, like a net of hair appearing to
someone suffering from timira, these forms do not allow a person to reach an external
thing that corresponds to them. They are not representations of anything real.
These four possibilities are typically listed within the framework of so called
khyāti theories, theories of (false) appearance.27
From Passage 4 we know that Ratnakı¯rti endorses the first possibility, according
to which the appearance of classes is the unfolding of mind itself: it is in virtue of
26 Again, this correspondence is not primarily one of phenomenal similarity. In this case, one would of
course expect phenomenal similarity only to the external cows, not to theword “cow.”But not even the cows
on the other side of the river are similar in this sense. They are similar only insofar as, if onewere told to fetch
a cow, one could cross the river and attempt to fetch a cow.What appears is a “mere thing” (vastumātra). See
the discussion of the vastumātra by Patil (2009, 234 ff.), who translates the term as “thing-in-general”. See
also Ratnakı¯rti’s argument against imposition due to similarity, below in Passage 7.
27 The most detailed treatment of these theories is found in Schmithausen (1965).
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variegated and beginningless impressions (vicitrānādivāsanāvaśāt) that a concep-
tual cognition is prepared to cause activity directed at an external thing. This means
that Ratnakı¯rti has to be understood as maintaining an ātmakhyāti position, which
says that it is cognition itself that appears.28
Let us sum up what we have so far been able to understand about Ratnakı¯rti’s
view on form, determination, and activity:
1. Activity is directed at something determined as external.
2. This determination is based on a form appearing to awareness.
3. What appears to awareness in order to be determined by it is conditioned by
beginningless impressions.
4. What appears is not a representation of something external.
5. Ratnakı¯rti endorsed a kind of ātmakhyāti position.
Dharmottara on Activity
What now is Dharmottara’s theory about how activity comes about?29
Steinkellner (1976, p. 124), having constituted the introductory verse of the
Apohaprakaraṇa (DhAP) according to Cakradhara’s Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga,
which preserves a Sanskrit version,30 renders the verse like this:
28 This is corroborated also by Schmithausen (1965, p. 234, n. 162), who says that Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯ maintains a
form of ātmakhyāti in his Sākārasiddhiśāstra (Sa¯SiS´a¯).
29 I will be focusing in the following on the DhAP, because it is there that the opinion of Dharmottara’s,
which is criticised by Ratnakı¯rti, is stated. For a discussion of determination as presented in an important
passage of Dharmottara’s NBṬ, see McCrea and Patil (2006, 325 ff.).
30 The verse runs as follows, according to the edition by Steinkellner (1976):






















NMGBh 132.24 introduces the quote as follows: jñānārthābhyām anya eveti dharmottaraḥ, tathā
cāhāsau—… (That [exclusion, the object of words, is] completely different from both cognition and
object, is what Dharmottara [says]. And accordingly he says: ….) As Steinkellner (1976, p. 123, n. 2)
notes, the first pāda, though with a corrupted ending (“vo¨llig korrumpiert”, Steinkellner 1976, p. 123,
n. 2), is also quoted by Aniruddha. It is interesting to see what is said about the verse in VP 41.21–26:
buddhyā kalpikayā viviktam aparair yad rūpam ullikhyate buddhir no na bahir tad eva ca padaṃ
niḥsattvam ābhāsate |
ity asya granthasyāyam arthaḥ. kalpikayā buddhyāvikalpikayā buddhyā vāparair vikalpāntaraiḥ viviktaṃ
yad rūpam ullikhyate, tad buddhir api na bhavati, bāhyo ’py artho na bhavati. kutaḥ ? yato ’paraiḥ
svalakṣaṇajñānatadgrāhyāntarair viviktaṃ pṛthakkṛtam ābhāsate teṣām ananuvṛttatvāt, etasya cānuvṛttat-
vena pratibhāsanād ity arthaḥ. (This is the point of that text[, Dharmottara’s Apohaprakaraṇa]: That very
form, which is depicted by conceptual awareness as separated from others, is neither awareness nor an
external thing, and appears as a thing without real existence. The form, which, separated from others[,
that is,] other conceptual cognitions, is depicted by a conceptual awareness or a non-conceptual
awareness, is not awareness nor is it an external thing. Why? Since it appears separated[, that is,]
disjoined, from others[, that is,] from the others that are the particular, the cognition itself, [and] that
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Having bowed my head to the teacher free from all errors, who has explained
that form which is distinguished from others by conceptual cognition, and who
has victoriously described to the world (its) nature by clarifying that it is
neither cognition nor external, that it is unreal and superimposed, I here
elaborate upon exclusion.31
The central claim expressed here is that the form (rūpa) which is differentiated by
conceptual cognition is neither awareness nor an external thing, and that it is unreal
and superimposed.32
Let us take a closer look at the statement for which Ratnakı¯rti criticizes
Dharmottara, as it appears in DhAP 244.1–9:
Passage 6: Dharmottara on the object of activity For33 an external [object],
awareness, a form, and a superimposed [thing] there is no negating or
affirming conceptual cognition. Affirming and negating are connected with a
superimposed [thing] that is ascertained as being external. For example, [when
one mistakes a rope for a snake,] there is no cognition affirming and negating a
snake for a material entity, the rope, since [that rope] does not appear [to that
cognition]. [Such a cognition] does also not exist for the awareness “snake,”
the grasped form, and the snake that is superimposed, because they do not go
astray with regard to what exists as their own proper nature. However, a
superimposed snake which is ascertained as an external snake is ascertained as
established or negated.34
Footnote 30 continued
grasped by this [cognition], because these are not acted upon [by a person], and because this [form]
appears as what is being acted upon. This is the intent [of that statement].)
31 This is my translation into English. The original German is:
Nachdem ich den von allen Fehlern freien Lehrer mit dem Haupte verehrt habe, der jene Form
erkla¨rt, die durch die vorstellende Erkenntnis von anderen unterschieden wurde, und siegreich der
Welt (ihre) wahre Natur beschrieben hat, indem er erla¨utert, daß sie weder Erkenntnis noch außen,
daß sie unwirklich und u¨bertragen ist, verbreite ich mich hier u¨ber diese Sonderung. (Steinkellner
1976, p. 124)
A slightly diverging translation by Hisataka Ishida is quoted by Kataoka (2009, p. 486, fn. 17). Note
that Steinkellner understands the phrase buddhyā kalpikayā viviktam aparair yad rūpam ullikhyate as
“jene Form erkla¨rt, die durch die vorstellende Erkenntnis von anderen unterschieden wurde”. Another
translation which seems possible to me is “the form which is depicted by conceptual cognition as
distinguished from others.” I will be presupposing this interpretation in the following.
32 Bhaṭṭa Jayanta understands this position as a major difference between Dharmakı¯rti’s and
Dharmottara’s apoha theories. Cf. Hattori (2006) and the conclusions drawn by Kataoka (2009, 487
ff.), who traces the roots of Dharmottara’s opinion back to Arcaṭa.
33 DhAP 244.1–9 (punctuation slightly changed): phyi rol daṅ blo daṅ rnam pa daṅ sgro btags pa la yaṅ
dgag pa daṅ sgrub par rtog pa ma yin no. sgrub pa daṅ dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gaṅ źig phyi rol ñid du
ṅes par byas pa de daṅ ’brel pa yin te, dper na sbrul sgrub pa daṅ dgag pa’i śes pa thag pa’i rdzas la ni
ma yin te, mi snaṅ ba’i phyir ro. sbrul gyi blo daṅ gzuṅ ba’i rnam pa daṅ sgro btags kyi sbrul la yaṅ ma
yin te, de dag ni raṅ gi raṅ bźin du yod pa la mi ’khrul pa’i phyir ro. ’on kyaṅ sgro btags kyi sbrul gaṅ źig
phyi rol gyi sbrul ñid du ṅes par byas pa de ni sgrub pa daṅ dgag par ṅes pa bźin no.
34 This translation is taken from Mc Allister (2011, p. 90), where I have also looked at the preceding
objection. For a German translation, see Frauwallner (1937, p. 265 f.).
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Dharmottara is explaining in which way an affirmation and negation, such as “It is,”
and “It is not,”, can be applied to an object of conceptual cognition. In his opinion,
that object has to be something of which both existence and non-existence can be
predicated, because conceptual cognitions obviously are able to judge both present
and absent objects.35
Dharmottara is illustrating what he thinks this object to be. He lists a few things
which this object is not, and then he defines it. He uses the example in which
someone takes a piece of rope to be a snake. The elements involved in this
confusion are as follows:
1. a rope,
2. the awareness of “snake”,
3. the grasped form “snake”,
4. the snake which is superimposed,
5. the superimposed snake that is ascertained as an external snake.
According to Dharmottara, the rope does not actually appear in the conceptual
cognition “This is a snake,” and hence there can be no affirmation or negation
directed at it.
Elements 2–4, however, are manifest in the judgement “This is a snake.” It is for
this reason, so Dharmottara holds, that they can actually not be the object of
affirmation or negation. As elements manifest in such a cognition, they exist
undoubtedly. This means that it would be contradictory to negate any of those
elements, because they directly appear to awareness with their own nature, and it
would be redundant to affirm them for the same reason.
The only element that remains is the superimposed snake that is ascertained as an
external snake (sgro btags kyi sbrul gaṅ źig phyi rol gyi sbrul ñid du ṅes par byas
pa). In its general form, this element is called “a superimposed [object] ascertained
as being external” (sgro btags gaṅ źig phyi rol ñid du ṅes par byas pa de). It is this
“superimposed thing that is ascertained as external” which alone can be affirmed or
negated, according to Dharmottara. Since Dharmottara argues that elements 2–4 are
not the object of conceptual cognition because they are directly manifest in self-
awareness, it can be assumed that the superimposed thing ascertained as external is
not manifest in self-awareness—implying that it is not grasped at all.
This marks a first difference to Ratnakı¯rti’s understanding of what can be, at least
conventionally, affirmed or negated: according to him, it is an external object.
According to Dharmottara, it is the superimposed thing, qualified by being
ascertained as external, that affirmation and negation can be directed at.36
A next point of interest is to see why they arrive at these different judgements.
Ratnakı¯rti, in the discussion following his statement about Dharmottara’s wrong
opinion, points out a criticism that could be advanced against imposition:
35 This is also the context in which the verse from Passage 1 appears in Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra’s AP.
36 Notice that Dharmottara does not make use of the tattvatas-saṃvṛtyā distinction as Ratnakı¯rti did. As
mentioned above in footnote 9, Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra criticizes Dharmottara exactly for this point. But Ratnakı¯rti
is silent on this issue.
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Passage 7: Criticism of imposition due to similarity Therefore,37 the state of
determining this [object] is, because of a relation to a specific form, the state
of being generative of the activity towards this [object]. But we do not speak
of activity due to a superimposition because of similarity, so that there would
be the possibility of a falsification [of our position] by means of superim-
position [either] of an external object on a form of awareness or of a form of
awareness on an external object; rather[, we say], an awareness—arising only
in virtue of the ripening of one’s own remaining impressions—even though
not seeing an external object, brings forth activity towards an external object.
Thus, [conceptual cognition] is completely mistaken.
Ratnakı¯rti here equates two things, the state of determining an object and the state of
producing activity towards that object, and then continues to say that activity due to
either of two kinds of superimposition is not accepted.38
This is the cue to take a closer look at what Dharmottara takes determination to
be,39 and brings us to the following passage from the DhAP:
37 AS 66.2–5: tasmāt tadadhyavasāyitvam ākāraviśeṣayogāt tatpravṛttijanakatvam. na ca sādṛśyād
āropeṇa pravṛttiṃ brūmaḥ, yenākāre bāhyasya bāhye vākārasyāropadvāreṇa dūṣaṇāvakāśaḥ, kiṃ tarhi
svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apaśyanty api bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti
viplutaiva.
38 McCrea and Patil (2010, p. 169, n. 213) note about the parallel passage in AP 226.9–12 that “[t]his
seems to be the position of Dharmottara, who argues that the conceptually constructed ‘determined
particular’ is superimposed on the real external particular.” Note that in the AP, the explicit criticism of
Dharmottara appears only 3 pages (AP 229.16–17) after this statement (AP 226.9–12). But in Ratnakı¯rti’s
rearrangement of arguments, this way of taking the argument would certainly be the most natural
understanding. The only reservation I have in equating this position to Dharmottara’s is that I have not yet
been able to find a clear passage in which Dharmottara says that superimposition is due to similarity.
39 To ask what he takes superimposition to be would be the same question, at least from the perspective
of Ratnakı¯rti, CAPV 135.31–136.2:
tathā vikalpāropābhimānagrahaniścayādayo ’py adhyavasāyavat svākāraparyavasitā eva sphu-
ranto bāhyasya vārtāmātram api na jānantīty adhyavasāyasvabhāvā eva śabdapravṛttini-
mittabhede ’pi, tat kathaṃ yuktyāgamābahirbhūto ’nātmāsphuraṇam ācakṣīta. (Read śabda-
pravṛttinimittabhede ’pi acc. to RNA¯ms 73a1 against the misprinted śabdapravṛttimittabhede ’pi
CAPV 136.1. Thakur’s emendation of yuktyāgamābahir to yuktyāgamabahir seems unnecessary.
Translation: In the same way, also conceptual cognition, imposition, conceit, taking [something as
something], restrictive fixation and so on, like determination, only ending in [cognition’s] own
form, [in as far as they] appear, know not even the merest news of an external [thing]. So [these]
have only the nature of determination, even though there are different causes for the use of [these]
words. Thus, how should someone not transgressing reasoning and scripture assert a manifestation
of what is not [cognition’s] self?)
For Ratnakı¯rti’s defense against the objection that this equation is against what is commonly accepted,
what the authoritative teachers taught and what is reasonable, cf. CAPV 136.3 ff. What makes the
difference for Ratnakı¯rti is the qualifier of all these conceptual operations, svākāraparyavasitā eva.
According to my understanding, none of these operations has any kind of phenomenal access to (or
manifestation of) an external thing. Determination is only a directing of activity at something external,
not a representation thereof.
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Passage 8: Dharmottara on determination [Opponent]: Now,40 is it not so that
conceptual cognition determines its own appearance, which is without the
object, as the object? Therefore, this [appearance] is its object. [Dharmottara:]
What is this [thing] called determination? Is it a grasping, or rather a making,
or a joining, or a superimposing? Amongst these [alternatives], how could
conceptual cognition grasp its own appearance, which is without the object, as
the object, or make [it so]? For one [thing] can not be made to have the nature
of another. Also, how could [conceptual cognition] join [its] self with a
particular, which is not grasped [by conceptual cognition]? If, furthermore,
superimposition is preceded by perception, conceptual cognition does not,
after first perceiving [this cognition’s] own appearance, superimpose [that
appearance] later; [for,] if a thing which lasts for two moments does not exist,
then how would this [conceptual cognition] superimpose onto another object
at a later time [its] self that was perceived earlier? Or, if it is at the same time
that [it] perceives its own nature and superimposes it as an object, well then, if
so, then that which is superimposed at the same time as the appearance [of
cognition] is perceived is not the nature of appearance. Therefore, it is
established that an object which does not exist is the object of conceptual
cognition. This also is assumed [by us]. [Opponent:] Now, it was said:
“[Conceptual cognition] is active through determining [its] own appearance,
which is without the object, as the object.”41 What does that mean?
[Dharmottara:] The meaning is this: the grasped form is not cognized as
different from the superimposed nature.
Very much the same passage is attributed to Trilocana by Ratnakı¯rti, and
reproduced by Va¯caspati in his Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTT
˙
), where it is said
to conform to the intention of Dharmottara.42
40 DhAP 238.7–25: gal te rnam par rtog pa raṅ gi snaṅ ba don med pa la don du lhag par źen pa ma yin
nam, de’i phyir de ni de’i yul yin no źe na, ci ste lhag par źen pa źes bya ba ’di ci yin, ci ’dzin pa yin nam,
’on te byed pa yin nam, de ste sbyor ba yin nam, ci ste sgro ’dogs pa yin, de la rnam par rtog pa raṅ gi
snaṅ ba don med pa la don du ’dzin par ji ltar ’gyur, byed par yaṅ ji ltar ’gyur te, gźan ni gźan gyi raṅ bźin
du bya bar nus pa ma yin no. ma bzuṅ ba’i raṅ gi mtshan ñid daṅ bdag ñid sbyor bar yaṅ ji ltar ’gyur, sgro
’dogs pa yaṅ ñams su myoṅ ba sṅon du ’gro ba can yin na, rnam par rtog pa ni sṅar raṅ gi snaṅ ba myoṅ
nas phyis sgro ’dogs pa yaṅ ma yin te, dṅos po skad cig gñis su sdod pa ni med na de ji ltar sṅar ñams su
myoṅ ba’i bdag ñid phyis don gźan la sgro ’dogs par byed, ci ste raṅ gi raṅ bźin ñams su myoṅ ba daṅ,
don du sgro ’dogs pa daṅ dus mñam pa yin na de ltar na ni ’o na snaṅ ba ñams su myoṅs ba daṅ dus
mñam du sgro btags pa snaṅ ba’i raṅ bźin ma yin pas dṅos po med pa rnam par rtog pa’i yul yin no źes
gnas pa de yaṅ ’dod pa yin no. ’o na raṅ gi snaṅ ba don med pa la don du źen nas ’jug pa yin no źes bśad
pa ’di’i don gaṅ yin źe na, sgro btags pa’i raṅ bźin de las gzuṅ ba’i rnam pa bye brag tu ma rtogs pa źes
bya ba’i don ’di yin no. For a German translation, see Frauwallner (1937, 258 f.). Kataoka (2009, p. 483,
fn. 18) comments on the last part of this passage, saying that it marks a reinterpretation of, and hence
difference to, Dharmakı¯rti’s statement concerning activity through determination, and that this way of
taking it is also confirmed by Jayanta’s view on the matter.
41 Cf. PVin 2 46.7.
42 I am aware of only three notes about this passage in secondary literature: the most recent one is in
Moriyama (2011), but since I do not know Japanese I cannot say much about it. The oldest note, by
Frauwallner (1937, p. 258, n. 1), simply points out that the passage is similar to the one found in NVTT
˙
.
The only detailed note is by Oberhammer (1964, p. 141, fn. 26), who has used this passage in explaining
the development of the Naiya¯yika’s svābhāvikasambandha. He says about this passage that it is directed
against Dharmottara’s theory of conceptual cognition (“Vorstellung”), and is a polemical adaptation
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So Dharmottara is claiming that activity results from a failure to understand the
difference between the grasped form and the superimposed nature. This superim-
posed nature (sgro btags pa’i raṅ bźin) I take to be the “superimposed [thing]
ascertained as external” (sgro btags gaṅ źig phyi rol ñid du ṅes par byas pa) from
above.43
This of course is different to Ratnakı¯rti’s classification of conceptual cognition as
ātmakhyāti, and should be regarded as asatkhyāti, on the basis that conceptual
cognition’s object is nistattva (cf. note 30).44 In addition, we can see from the above
explanation that the main error of conceptual cognition lies in not grasping a
difference between the external thing and the form grasped by cognition.45
This position is explicitly rejected by Ratnakı¯rti:
Passage 9: Determination as not grasping a difference And46 neither is the non-
grasping of a difference [between cognition’s own form and an external thing] to
be called determination.47 For [it is] so: [is the difference not grasped] in [the
case of] a grasped external [thing] or in [the case of an] ungrasped [external
thing]? Not the first position, because the grasping of an external [thing] was
rejected. Or because, if there is a grasping [of an external thing], [there is] the
Footnote 42 continued
(“polemische Bearbeitung—zum Teil im gleichen Wortlaut”) of the corresponding passage in the DhAP.
But he does not point out what it is exactly that is polemical in this passage, and I must admit that I fail to
see the point. Having given my own translation attempt above, and having closely studied Frauwallner’s
translation (Frauwallner 1937, p. 258 f.), I think there is no difference to Dharmottara’s position that the
object that one acts towards is an unreal, superimposed thing. So the consequences drawn by Trilocana
(as reported by Ratnakı¯rti) and Dharmottara are, in my opinion, the same.
43 DhAP 239.11–13: gaṅ gi phyir sgro btags pa la ni phyi rol du ṅes par byas pa yin pa’i phyir phyi rol
’dra ba phyi rol gyi gzugs brñan źes brjod par nus pa yin no. (Because regarding the superimposed [thing]
one can say “reflection of an external [thing]” like “external thing,” since [the superimposed thing] is
ascertained as external.) Frauwallner (1937, p. 260) understands: “Denn beim U¨bertragen kann man, weil
es als außen bestimmt wird, wie beim A¨ußeren von einem Spiegelbild des A¨ußeren sprechen.”
44 Support for this estimate of Dharmottara’s position is found in Jayanta. Cf. the explanations given in
Kataoka (2009, 483 f.), and see Jayanta’s text in NMK2 463 ff. According to Jayanta, Dharmottara is to be
counted as following the path of asatkhyāti, whereas Dharmakı¯rti follows that of ātmakhyāti.
45 Cf. also DhAP 251.3–12, translated by Akamatsu (1986, 74 f.), where Dharmottara states that, upon
having cognized an absolute negation as superimposed on conceptual cognition, one determines an
external absolute negation “…en vertu de la de´termination de la non-diffe´rence (abhedādhyavasāya)
[entre ces deux ne´gations absolues].” (Akamatsu 1986, p. 75)
46 CAPV 135.1–4: na ca bhedāgraho ’dhyavasāyo vaktavyaḥ. tathā hi kiṃ bāhye gṛhyamāṇe
’grahyamāṇe vā. na ca prathamaḥ pakṣaḥ, bāhyagrahaṇasya pratikṣiptatvāt, grahaṇe vādhyavasāyasya
pratyakṣatāprasaṅgāt. agṛhyamāṇe tu bāhye pravṛttiniyamo na syāt, anyeṣām api tadānīm agrahaṇād
anyatrāpi pravṛttiprasaṅgāt.
47 This is the last of a list of candidates for determination that Ratnakı¯rti discusses and refutes (CAPV
133.24–135.31). His conclusion, after backing his arguments against these possibilities with quotes from
Trilocana and Va¯caspati, is that determination just breaks apart in whichever way it is considered: CAPV
135.30–31 tasmād yathā yathāyam adhyavasāyaś cintyate, tathā tathā viśīryata eva. (Cf. the conclusion at
Sa¯SiS´a¯ 389.8: tasmād yāvac cintyate, tāvad āropyasparśābhāvan nāropo nāma.) The options listed by
Ratnakı¯rti in CAPV 133.25–28 fall into two groups: the first group contains candidates for determination
that have only one element, brought to awareness by appearance, and the second has two elements,
internal and external, brought together by some form of cognitive function. Interestingly, the second
group also contains ekīkaraṇam, identifying the external thing and the internal appearance, which,
according to Kataoka (2009, p. 481), is how Jayanta sees Dharmakı¯rti’s position.
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[unwanted] consequence of determination being perception. But if an external
[thing] is not being grasped, there would not be a restriction of activity, because
of the consequence that [there is], due to the non-grasping of others aswell at that
time, activity towards [these] others as well.
Ratnakı¯rti is here pointing out the various difficulties of the position that determination
is the non-grasping of a difference between a form internal to cognition and something
external to cognition. This can be seen as a broad attack on positions such as
Dharmottara’s. The option best suited to Dharmottara’s opinion is the second: a non-
grasping of that difference without grasping an external thing. That this external
component is not grasped on Dharmottara’s theory is evident: the material entity (the
rope in Passage 6) is not grasped by conceptual cognition, and the superimposed thing
ascertained as external, the object of activity according toDharmottara, is not grasped,
since that is what differentiates it from the other elements of conceptual cognition, and
makes it that cognition’s only viable object in the first place. Ratnakı¯rti concludes that
successful activity cannot be explained in this theory, because it would be directed at
all external things, since they are also not grasped: for how should an ungrasped
difference between a form of cognition and an ungrasped thing allow a person to act
towards one specific thing, rather than towards another?
Conclusion
So what is the answer to the leading question: what is it that Ratnakı¯rti criticizes
about Dharmottara’s theory of conceptual cognition?
The main points are these:
1. There is a disagreement about the object of activity. For Ratnakı¯rti, it is an
object external to cognition which one acts towards in a conventional manner.
For Dharmottara, the object is a superimposed thing that is deemed external,
which is to say, the externality of the superimposed thing.
2. This difference about activity’s object can be traced to two causes:
(a) A difference about how determination is understood. For Dharmottara,
determination consists in not grasping the difference between the
(externally) superimposed nature and the grasped form of awareness
itself, whereas for Ratnakı¯rti determination is simply the fact that
conceptual awareness can direct activity at an external thing; there is no
actually external element involved in this determination.
(b) A difference about the ontological status of the object of activity. For
Dharmottara, it is superimposed and unreal (nistattva, alīka); for
Ratnakı¯rti it is a generalized external object (which is conventionally
taken to exist).
We see that the two issues under the second point are about what appears to a
conceptual cognition, and about how it appears to it. In other words, this is a
discussion about the status of the form, or ākāra, appearing in a conceptual
cognition, and about the epistemological framework in which this form is
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embedded. It is interesting to note that the main criticism that Ratnakı¯rti advances
against Dharmottara’s apoha theory is actually a broad attack on Dharmottara’s
epistemology, at least on the part that is concerned with conceptual cognition.
Cognitive forms, and the epistemological functions concerned with them, are thus at
the centre of their debate. From this we can conclude that their differences about
apoha are not so much due to their ideas of exclusion, as rather to the fact that their
epistemological points of view differ. That means that the differences in their apoha
theories should, in my opinion, be explained as the result of more fundamental
disagreements in their epistemological positions, and not as a cause for these
disagreements. Another indication for the existence of this underlying issue is that it
influences various theories. It is for this reason that it appears in different contexts of
Ratnakı¯rti’s work: in the AS and in the CAPV.
If it is correct that Dharmottara and Ratnakı¯rti’s disagreement is essentially due to
their different views of howdeterminationworks andwhat the formof cognition is, then
it could be worthwhile to study whether this difference is also at the heart of other
discussions about conceptual cognition in that period of Indian philosophy. A starting
point could be the following question:What is the relationofDharmottara andTrilocana
(as well as Va¯caspatimis´ra) concerning determination, that is, the cognitive function
burdened with making a form appearing in cognition into an actionable object?
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a. In JNA¯ (pp. 201–232).
AS Ratnakı¯rti. Apohasiddhi. In RNA¯2 (pp. 58–66).
CAPV Ratnakı¯rti. Citra¯dvaitapraka¯s´ava¯da. In RNA¯2 (pp. 129–144).
DhAP Dharmottara. Apohaprakaran
˙
a. In Frauwallner 1937 (pp. 235–254).
JNĀ A. Thakur (Ed.) (1987). Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali. Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra.
Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
NBṬ Dharmottara. Nya¯yabindut
˙
ı¯ka¯. In Malvania 1971.
NK Va¯caspatimis´ra. Nya¯yakan
˙
ika¯. In Goswami 1984.






a. In Kataoka 2009 (pp. 473–458).
NMGBh Cakradhara. Nya¯yaman˜jarı¯granthibhan˙ga. In Shah 1972.
NVTṬ Va¯caspatimis´ra. Nya¯yava¯rttikata¯tparyat
˙
ı¯ka¯. In Thakur 1996.
PVin2 Dharmakı¯rti. Prama¯n
˙
avinis´caya 2. In Steinkellner 2007 (pp. 45–101).
RNĀ1 A. Thakur (Ed.) (1957a). Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī. Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti. Patna:
Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
RNĀ2 A. Thakur (Ed.) (1975b). Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvaliḥ. Buddhist Nya¯ya Works of Ratnakı¯rti. Patna:
Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
RNĀms Ratnakı¯rti. Ratnakı¯rtinibandha¯vali. A manuscript photographed by Sa¯n˙kr
˙
tya¯yana. The negatives
are kept in Patna (cf. Much 1988). I had available to me scans based on copies of those negatives,
kept in the “Sammlung des Seminars fu¨r Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Go¨ttingen.” Cf. the
description of item “Xc 14/26” in Bandurski (1994: 58–60), as well as Thakur (1975a). This ms is
the basis for the two editions RNA¯1 and RNA¯2 . Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra. Sa¯ka¯rasiddhis´a¯stra.





apanjika¯. In Thakur 1969.
324 P. Mc Allister
123
References
Akamatsu, A. (1986). Vidhiva¯din et Pratis
˙
edhava¯din. Double aspect pre´sente´ par la the´orie se´mantique du
bouddhisme indien. Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, 21, 67–89.
Bandurski, F. (1994). U¨bersicht u¨ber die Go¨ttinger Sammlungen der von Ra¯hula Sa¯n˙kr
˙
tya¯yana in Tibet
aufgefundenen buddhistischen Sanskrit-Texte (Funde buddhistischer Sanskrit-Handschriften, III). In
F. Bandurski, B. Pa¯sa¯dika, M. Schmidt, & B. Wang (Eds.), Untersuchungen zur buddhistischen
Literatur (pp. 9–126). Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Chu, J. (2004). A study of Sataimira in Digna¯ga’s definition of pseudo-perception (PS 1.7cd-8ab). Wiener
Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens,48, 113–149.
Frauwallner, E. (1937). Beitra¨ge zur Apohalehre: II: Dharmottara. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des
Morgenlandes,44, 233–287.
Goswami, M. L. (Ed.). (1984). Vidhiviveka of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra with the commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of
Vācaspati Miśra. Varanasi: Tara Printing Works.
Hattori, M. (2006). The Apoha theory as referred to in the Nyāyamañjarī. Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the
Institute for Eastern Culture,90, 55–70.
Kajiyama, Y. (1998). In E. Steinkellner (Ed.), An introduction to Buddhist philosophy. An annotated
translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta. Vienna: Arbeitskreis fu¨r Tibetische und
Buddhistische Studien Universita¨t Wien.




a Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī: The Buddhist refutation of
Kuma¯rila’s criticism of apoha. The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo,
156(December), 498–458.
Katsura, S. (1986). Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra on apoha. In B. K. Matilal & R. D. Evans (Eds.), Buddhist logic and
epistemology. Studies in the Buddhist analysis of inference and language (pp. 171–183). Dordrecht:
Reidel.
Malvania, P. D. (Ed.). (1971). Paṇḍita Durveka Mīśra’s Dharmottarapradīpa (Being a sub-commentary
on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu). Patna: Kashi
Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
Mc Allister, P. (2011). Ratnakīrti’s Apohasiddhi. A critical edition, annotated translation, and study. PhD
dissertation, Institute for South Asian, Tibetan, & Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna.
http://othes.univie.ac.at/17119/.
Mc Allister, P. (Forthcoming). Determination (adhyavasāya) in Ratnakı¯rti’s Apohasiddhi. In P. Mc
Allister, C. A. Scherrer-Schaub, & H. Krasser (Eds.), Cultural ﬂows across the Western Himalaya.
McCrea, L. J., & Patil, P. G. (2006). Traditionalism and innovation. Philosophy, exegesis, and intellectual
history in Jn˜a¯nas´rı¯mitra’s Apohaprakaraṇa. Journal of Indian Philosophy,34(4), 303–366.
McCrea, L. J., & Patil, P. G. (2010). Buddhist philosophy of language in India. Jñānaśrīmitra on
exclusion. New York: Columbia University Press.
Moriyama, S. (2011). An annotated Japanese translation of Ratnakı¯rti’s Citra¯dvaitapraka¯s´ava¯da (1). South
Asian Classical Studies,6, 51–92.
Much, M. T. (1988). A visit to Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana’s collection of negatives at the Bihar Research
Society: Texts from the Buddhist epistemological school. Wien: Arbeitskreis fu¨r Tibetische und
Buddhistische Studien Universita¨t Wien.
Oberhammer, G. (1964). Der Sva¯bha¯vika-Sambandha, ein geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Nya¯ya-Logik.
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie,8, 131–181.
Patil, P. G. (2003). On what it is that Buddhists think about. apoha in the Ratnakı¯rti-Nibandha¯vali.
Journal of Indian Philosophy,31(1–3), 229–256.
Patil, P. G. (2009). Against a Hindu God. Buddhist philosophy of religion in India. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Patil, P. G. (2011, June). Without brackets. A minimally annotated translation of Ratnakı¯rti’s
demonstration of exclusion. Accessed 3 December 2012, from http://cup.columbia.edu/media/
7285/side15360_patil.pdf.
Schmithausen, L. (1965). Maṇḍanamiśra’s Vibhramavivekaḥ. Mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der
indischen Irrtumslehre. Vienna: Verlag der O¨sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Shah, N. J. (Ed.). (1972). Cakradhara’s Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga (Vol. 35). Ahmedabad: L. D.
Institute of Indology.
Steinkellner, E. (1976). Der Einleitungsvers von Dharmottaras Apo- haprakaran
˙
am. Wiener Zeitschrift für
die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie,20, 123–124.
Ratnakı¯rti and Dharmottara on the Object of Activity 325
123
Steinkellner, E. (1979). Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Vol. 2:
Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Vienna: Verlag der O¨sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Steinkellner, E. (Ed.). (2007). Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2. Beijing: China
Tibetology Research Center, Austrian Academy of Sciences.
Steinkellner, E., & Much, M. T. (1995). Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus.
Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur II/Systematic Survey of Buddhist
Sanskrit Literature II. Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Thakur, A. (Ed.). (1969). Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikaṭīkāvivaraṇapanjikā [II–V] of Aniruddhācārya. Darbhanga:
Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies & Research in Sanskrit Learning.
Thakur, A. (1975a). English introduction. In A. Thakur (Ed.), Ratnakīrti-niban-dhāvaliḥ. Buddhist Nyāya
works of Ratnakīrti (pp. 1–25). Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
Thakur, A. (Ed.). (1975b). Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvaliḥ. Buddhist Nyāya works of Ratnakīrti. Patna: Kashi
Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
Thakur, A. (Ed.). (1996). Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra. New Delhi: Indian Council of
Philosophical Research.
326 P. Mc Allister
123
